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(over file)
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

THE PROSPECTS FOR TURKEY

- Political Situation and Outlook
- Economic Situation and Outlook
- Longer Term Outlook
- International Affairs



NOTE: This is an advance copy of the conclusions of this estimate as approved by the United States Intelligence Board. The complete text will be circulated within five days of this issuance.

Central Intelligence Agency

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Submitted by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA.

Concurred in by the

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

on 13 February 1963. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

13 February 1963

SUBJECT: NIE 29.2-63: THE PROSPECTS FOR TURKEY

CONCLUSIONS

A. We believe that Turkey's present coalition government under Prime Minister Inonu will hold together for another year or so, and perhaps until the elections due by late 1965. The disappearance of the 78-year-old Inonu would significantly lessen these chances. The opposition Justice Party, which draws its support mainly from the ranks of Menderes' former Democratic Party, is steadily gaining popular support and has a good chance to win a plurality if not an outright majority in the next parliament. The military are not convinced that parliamentary government can solve Turkey's problems, but are well aware of the wide popular opposition to their resumption of power. The senior officers are cooperating with the Inonu government, but even in the event of a Justice Party victory they probably will be hesitant to intervene. (Paras. 11-13)

B. Over the longer term the delicate balance of political and military forces is likely to be threatened by growing discontent with

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the pace of Turkey's economic and social development. This dissatisfaction has led to greater respectability for various socialist and authoritarian ideas. The peasants, on the other hand, remain deeply conservative and will oppose any attempt to deny them the feeling of political influence they possessed under Menderes. The growing gap between urban and rural population poses a basic political problem.

These trends raise the question whether Turkey will be able to continue its efforts toward modernization under a democratic system, or whether a more radical revolution is likely. Future developments will depend heavily on the extent of Turkey's economic progress and on the quality of leaders that Turkey develops over the coming decade. (Paras. 21-23)

C. Turkey will have considerable difficulty in raising the resources for its ambitious Five-Year Plan, which aims at a seven percent annual growth in GNP. Both internal revenue and foreign aid are likely to fall short of the amount needed to carry out all the investments called for in the first year of the plan. An annual growth rate of four to five percent is probably the best that can be achieved, and in view of Turkey's rapid population growth only slow increases in living standards are likely. (Paras. 17-20)

D. Turkey will continue to regard the USSR as its major enemy and the US and NATO as the only feasible sources of protection against the

- 2 -

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Soviet Bloc. We believe awareness of the Soviet threat and of the basic community of interests between Turkey and the US will insure continuance of close Turkish-US relations including use of present base facilities. Turkey's present effort to expand economic ties with Western Europe is likely to result eventually in some form of Turkish adherence to the European Economic Community, although the terms may not be as favorable as the Turks now hope. In the Middle East, Turkey will probably continue to be concerned primarily with preventing the spread of Communist and Nasserist influence and with protecting the Turkish community in Cyprus. (Paras. 24-28)

- 3 -

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